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Financial protection is one of the objectives of health systems, which protects poor 
households from falling into poverty as a result of health care related expenses. Expanding 
prepayment schemes to the poor is difficult in developing countries because labor is largely 
informal.  Providing health care free-at-point-of-service does not adequately target 
spending on the poorest, but occupation- or community-based schemes have also inherent 
limitations to achieve universal coverage. Colombia adopted a government-subsidized 
health insurance scheme (SHI) strategy. The political debate about increasing SHI 
enrollment needs evidence about the effectiveness of this scheme regarding financial 
protection. This study runs a four-part model to estimate the effect of SHI on out-of-pocket 
expenses by the poor that are currently uninsured, if they were enrolled in the SHI. The 
results show a 43% and 50% reduction in expenses at Bogotá and national level 
respectively, which confirms the effectiveness of SHI as a financial protection tool.  
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One of the health system’s goals that is pointed out by the World Health Organization is to 
guarantee an equitable contribution to the financing of the system (WHO, 2000). This 
entails the implementation of a progressive tax-based collection system (either general 
taxes or payroll taxes) independent of individual risk, and an adequate insurance scheme 
that isolates households of the financial negative impacts of disease or trauma. Financial 
protection thus emerges as one of the key functions of health systems as household’s health 
care expenses are major causes of impoverishment (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2003), 
Preker (2002)). For example, in rural China, the collapse of cooperatives after the 
marketizing reforms of the eighties left households fully responsible for health-related 
expenses. Consequently, the number of households that fall below the poverty line 
                                                 
• Las opiniones aquí expresadas son responsabilidad de los autores y por lo tanto no deben ser interpretadas 
como propias de la Facultad de Economía ni de la Universidad del Rosario 
 increased by 44% (Liu, 2004). Hsiao (2002) reports that the most important cause of 
household’s failure to pay back debts to the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, was 
impoverishment due to health-related expenses.  
 
One key strategy to improve financial protection is to expand prepayment schemes, and to 
enlarge the pooling ability of these schemes to the highest possible level (WHO, 2000). 
This allows to disperse large risks without threatening financial viability of the whole 
insurance scheme. However, insurance schemes in developing countries are difficult to 
implement because a large share of the economy is informal, so that the operation of a 
social insurance scheme or a large voluntary insurance scheme is difficult to operate. 
Expectations in the seventies that labor will become more formal, have been frustrated in 
the nineties to recognize that informality has increased, making social security coverage to 
stall (Unni and Rani, 2001).  
 
This puts a difficult challenge to achieve financial protection for the poor, because they are 
precisely the ones in the informal economy, and the more difficult to reach through social 
security schemes. A traditional approach has been to offer services free-at-point-of-service, 
through a supply-side subsidized network of public providers. This approach is based on 
the assumption that these services will be self-targeted, which allows the poor to be 
financially protected.  However, self-targeting has been shown to fail to reach the poor, 
particularly regarding intermediate and high complexity health care services (Gwatkin, 
2005). 
 
An alternative approach to supply-side subsidized services has been the emergence of 
community-based insurance schemes.  These schemes are based on community links rather 
than on employer-employee relationships, because the latter are very informal and 
discontinuous. Given that poor households spend a large share of their income in health-
related events, efforts should be made to redirect these outlays towards prepayment 
schemes to improve efficiency in purchasing services (Hsiao, 2002). In a different sense, 
Gillion (1999) proposes to expand social security to the informal sector by targeting the 
informal uninsured through their occupational links.  
 
Either occupation-based or community-based, insurance schemes with informal population 
face other types of challenges, mainly adverse selection, provider capture, and lack of 
large-scale pooling. Lack of managerial capacity to perform enrolment, collections, 
purchasing and an adequate handling of financial resources, reinforce the weaknesses of 
these schemes (Preker (2002), Jakab and Krishnan (2002)).  
 
A third approach is to create a government-based insurance scheme that enrolls the poor at 
no cost or with a partial contribution to the premium. The insurance scheme is operated by 
insurers who contract with providers as any other third party payer. This is the scheme of 
the Medicaid in the United States, and more specifically the Medicaid HMO scheme. 
However, a tax-credit strategy to reduce the insurance price and encourage the uninsured to 
enroll has limited effect given the low price elasticity of insurance among the target group 
(Gruber and Poterba, 1993). Increased government funding to expand coverage has also 
had limited effect (Madden et al, 1995). The reduced effect of these strategies is explained 
by Chernew et al (1997) by the presence of safety net hospitals providing free care, which work as a substitute for insurance. Craig (1991) also argues that costs related to 
information, processing, and stigma; prevent poor households from taking up a subsidized 
scheme. 
 
Experiences in developing countries have also been analyzed, although less thoroughly. 
The health card scheme in Thailand is a good case in point (Supakankunti, 2000).  This was 
a partial subsidy to the premium, that was implemented by the government to increase 
enrollment among the poor. It is likely that the participation of the government has 
encouraged poor household’s participation, but adverse selection still pervaded the scheme.  
 
The Colombian subsidized health insurance scheme 
 
Colombia launched a major health sector reform in 1993, aimed at universal coverage. 
However, its large share of informal economy, which in 2003 was 61% (DANE, 2003), 
stands as a major obstacle to expand employment-based social insurance schemes. Thus, a 
subsidized health insurance (SHI) scheme was created to enroll informal workers and the 
indigent. The scheme is financed via a 1% payroll tax paid by formal workers plus a share 
of general tax revenues. The municipal authorities apply a proxy-means test to identify the 
eligible poor or informal workers, and the government transfers the necessary funds to 
enroll them in the scheme. However, with only few exceptions, municipalities have higher 
number of eligible poor than resources available to enroll them in the SHI, so they must 
enroll the poorest of the poor according to the score yielded by the proxy-means test. Once 
the municipality has selected the group of eligible poor to be enrolled, it opens a 
competitive process through which the selected eligible choose the insurer of their 
preference among the options that have been previously authorized to operate the SHI.  
Then, the municipality transfers to the insurer the corresponding premium and the insurer is 
responsible for providing the contents of the benefit package that has been defined by the 
national authority of the health social security system. This benefit package is not as 
comprehensive as the package of the employment-based insurance, because the resources 
for financing the premiums are smaller. Those interventions not included in the package are 
provided by the public network and are not the responsibility of the SHI insurers. 
 
Although in principle the 1993 reform aimed at enrolling 70% of the population in the 
employment-based scheme and only the remainder 30% in the SHI (roughly 30 million and 
13 million enrollees respectively, by 2005), the high proportion of informal workers has 
made impossible to reach the 70% goal for the employment-based scheme. By 2005, the 
scheme hardly covered 16 million enrollees, falling short of its 30 million expected 
enrollment. The government has tried to bridge this gap by expanding coverage through the 
SHI, which by 2005 covered about 16 million enrollees plus 1.8 million additional 
enrollees covered with a very limited subsidized scheme. 
 
The government and the legislative bodies have made several proposals to increase 
coverage by the SHI, all of which depend on available resources and its long-term 
sustainability. One relevant question for the policy debate regards the positive effects of 
insurance in terms of financial protection and access to health care services. Many critics of 
the reform have pointed out that insurers in the SHI create access barriers to enrollees, and 
indeed have proposed the abolition of the SHI. However, previous empirical evidence suggests that this scheme reduces financial barriers to access (Yepes and Ramírez, 2003). It 
has also been shown that insurance status has a strong positive effect on access (Restrepo et 
al, 2005), and that enrollees in the SHI have lower out-of-pocket (OOP) spending as 
compared to the uninsured (O’Meara et al, 2003). 
 
Accordingly, this study aimed at estimating the effect of enrollment in the SHI on OOP 
expenses as a means of testing the potential for financial protection of the SHI. A large 





A cross sectional national level LSMS-type survey was used to test the reduction in OOP 
expenses among the poor uninsured.  The survey was carried out during the second half of 
2003, and is representative at the national level, and it is also representative at the local 
level for Bogotá, the capital of Colombia. The survey collects information, among others, 
on household’s income, expenses, and health care consumption.  This latter topic includes 
information on OOP expenses related to the last contact with a health care provider within 
the previous month, and related to inpatient expenses during the last year. The survey 
allows to identify those enrolled in the employment-based insurance scheme, and those 
enrolled in the SHI. The remainder of the sample, the uninsured, had to be split into those 
who were eligible for SHI and those who were not. For this purpose, the proxy-means test 
score was applied because the survey includes the same information that is used for the 
application of the test. It made possible to separate the uninsured into the six categories of 
the test, and those included in the lower two categories were considered as poor uninsured, 
whereas the rest were considered non-poor uninsured. This analysis focuses on the 
uninsured poor.  
 
A four-part model was used to estimate the coefficients of the determinants of OOP 
expenses both on outpatient and inpatient care. The model was specified as follows: 
 
•  1 Pr( 0) ( ) i MED xi γ >= Φ        ( 1 )  
•  2 Pr( 0| 0) ( ) ii INP MED xi γ >> = Φ       ( 2 )  
•  3 log( | 0, 0) ii i i i MED MED INP x v γ >= = +
i
     (3) 
•  4 log( | 0) ii i MED INP x w γ >= +      ( 4 )  
 
Where  MED is OOP expenses during the last year and  INP  OOP expenses incurred on 
inpatient care only, during the last year. Equations (1) and (2) are logit models, where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if individual had positive OOP and 0 otherwise. 
 
Equations (3) and (4) are loglinear models where the dependent variable is the log of OOP.  
Equation (3) refers to those who had any OOP>0 and equation (4) refers to those who had 
inpatient OOP>0, given that they had any OOP >0. Equations (3) and (4) were estimated by 
ordinary least squares.   and   are the error terms of equations (3) y (4), and  i v i w() ( ) 0 ii Ev Ew == . Given the highly skewed distribution of health OOP expenses, the error 
terms cannot be assumed to have a normal distribution. This requires the use of the 
smearing estimate proposed by Duan (1983), which is the average of the exponentiated 
error terms: 
 
exp( )/ jii n ϕε =∑ j  
 
Accordingly, the expected OOP expenses can be estimated as: 
 
E(OOP)= 33 44 [(1 )exp( ) exp( ) ] ii i ii px x π γϕ π γϕ −+ 
 
Where  i p  is the probability to have any OOP>0,  i π  is the probability to have any inpatient 
OOP>0,  33 exp( ) i xγ ϕ  is the estimation of OOP given no inpatient expenses, and 
44 exp( ) i xγ ϕ  is the estimation of inpatient-related OOP. 
 
The variables on the right-hand side of the equations were:  
 
-  Self-reported health status: it is a four-category variable (excelent, good, fair, poor) 
that was aggregated into two categories.  The excluded category is the one that 
aggregates fair and poor. 
-  Chronic disease, where 1=presence of chronic disease, 0 otherwise. 
-  Age and gender, expressed either in seven age-gender categories or separately as a 
continuous variable (age) and as a dichotomous variable (gender); choice of one or 
the other depended on which fits best in the model. 
-  Household’s per-capita income, estimated by overall per-capita expenditures, 
according to Ramírez et al (2005) 
-  Number of household members. 
-  Educational level of the most highly educated member of household. 
-  Urban/rural location of household (for national estimations). 
-  Local area in Bogotá (for Bogotá-only estimations). 
 
t-tests were run for statistical significance, Wald tests for significance of categorical 
variables and for the overall model. The software used for the analysis was Stata 8.0. 
 
Once estimated, the four-part models were “recycled”, i.e., the coefficients obtained in the 
estimations with the insured population, were applied to the poor-uninsured.  This allows to 





1.  Equation (1): the probability of having any OOP > 0.  
 Table 1 shows the coefficients for equation (1) among those enrolled in the SHI, both for 
the whole country sample and for Bogota only. Poor health status, the presence of chronic 
conditions, age and higher income are statistically significant as predictors of OOP>0. 
Regional differences are significant at the country level but not at the Bogota level 
(excluded from the model). The coefficients for the poor-uninsured are shown in table 2, 
and reflect the same pattern observed in table 1, except for the fact that differences among 
local areas in Bogota are significant. 
 
2.  Equation (2): the probability of having inpatient OOP>0, given any OOP>0. 
 
Table 3 shows the coefficients for equation (2) among those enrolled in the SHI.  Self-
reported health status shows non-significant effect for both samples, but age and the 
presence of chronic condition does. Income has significant effect only in the national 
sample, whereas education does only in the Bogota sample. Local area differences in 
Bogota had no statistically significant effect. Table 4 shows the coefficients among the 
poor-uninsured. Self-reported health status has significant effect in the Bogota sample but 
the effect of chronic conditions and age is non-significant. Regional differences at the 
national level and local area differences in Bogota showed a non-significant effect. Income 
was non-significant in the Bogota sample. 
 
3.  Equation (3): Expected expenses for those having any OOP>0 
 
Table 6 shows the OLS-predicted coefficients for equation (3), for those enrolled in the 
SHI. While age has no statistically significant effect at the national level but it does at the 
Bogota level, the effect of local area differences in Bogota is significant but the regional 
differences at the national level are not. For the poor uninsured, table 6 shows that age has 
no significant effect in Bogota, whereas educational status has no effect at the country 
level.  
 
4.  Equation (4): Expected expenses for those having inpatient OOP>0, given any 
OOP>0. 
 
Table 8 shows the OLS-predicted coefficients for equation (4), for those enrolled in the 
SHI. Although the effect of regional differences were statistically significant for the 
country sample, local area differences were only significant at an α of 10%. Gender was 
nonsignificant for an α of 5%, and age and chronic disease were only significant for the 
national sample. For the poor-uninsured population, shown in table 8, self-reported health 
status and age-gender categories are nonsignificant for Bogotá, and regional differences 
were significant at the country level but local area differences for Bogotá were not.  
 
5.  Recycling: the effect of enrollment in the SHI for the poor-uninsured, on OOP 
 
Graph 1 shows the expected monthly OOP expenses for any type of health care among the 
poor-uninsured according to the four-part model estimation, and the expenses they would 
face were they enrolled in the SHI, according to the “recycled” model using the coefficients 
of the model for those enrolled in the SHI. It is clear that enrolling all the Colombian poor-uninsured in the SHI scheme would reduce their OOP expenses by more than 50%, and in 
the case of Bogota this reduction would be 43%.  Given the high probability of falling into 
poverty due to health care related expenses, the SHI scheme seems an effective tool to 




According to graph 1, it is evident that the SHI would drastically reduce OOP expenses by 
poor households if they were enrolled in this scheme. Even though the benefit package if 
the SHI excludes secondary and tertiary care, and it only covers primary care and high-cost 
conditions, the reduction in OOP expenses makes it a worth pursuing strategy to provide 
financial protection. Obviously this protection would be much better if these poor 
uninsured were enrolled in the employment-based scheme. However, available resources 
would not be large enough to pay the corresponding premium for this scheme (CP$ 
386.000 for 2006), which is 80% above the premium for the SHI scheme (CP$ 215.000 for 
2006).  On the contrary, resources available are more likely to increase insurance coverage 
by enrolling the poor uninsured to the SHI. An additional reason for not enrolling the poor 
uninsured in the employment-based scheme is that it would be a disincentive for those 
formal workers that are currently enrolled in this scheme.  This has been previously pointed 
out by Gruber (2003), who underscores the crowding-out effect that a full subsidy to a 
comprehensive package would have over insurance bought by employers in the US. 
 
Achieving universal health insurance coverage is a big challenge for Colombia about which 
one cannot be very optimistic. Increasing enrollment in the employment-based scheme 
would take costly efforts towards small firms and self-employed workers, not only to 
enforce enrollment, but also to enforce the payment of payroll taxes based on the real salary 
of the worker. In addition, such enforcement would have a negative effect on formal 
employment, as employers in these firms would prefer to shift to informality than face the 
costs of paying all the taxes and contributions. Thus, the country has to achieve a delicate 
balance between formal employment and enrollment in the employment-based health 
insurance scheme. 
 
So it is inevitable to accept the current levels of enrollment in the employment-based 
scheme (about 37% of the population) as exogenous, varying only with the dynamics of the 
labor markets. The alternative to increase coverage is to enroll more poor-uninsured in the 
SHI scheme. However, given that if an individual is enrolled today the government has to 
make sure it will have the money to pay the premium for the coming years, long-term 
resource constraints are the key to expand coverage. Some of the proposals discussed in the 
legislative bodies have considered that the payroll tax formal employees pay to the SHI is 
increased from 1% to 2% as a source of fresh resources. However, this is a risky decision, 
as it has been shown that a -0.4 price elasticity of labor (Kugler and Kugler 2002) would 
cause a further decrease in employment, let alone the substitution effect with informal 
labor. Certainly, this trade-off is worth analyzing carefully, before embracing a proposal 
that has been enthusiastically promoted by politicians narrowly sensitive to the health 
sector.  
 But even if the country had the necessary resources to enroll the poor-uninsured in the SHI, 
it would be likely that not all the eligible will decide to enroll. On the one hand, according 
to Craig (1991), the responses of target populations to the offer of a subsidy, the so-called 
take-up behavior, predict that some households will prefer not to enroll, due to information, 
processing, and stigma costs. A second factor that discourages take-up is the presence of a 
perfect substitute to insurance, namely, the public hospital network. If people can show up 
at the local hospital when sick, and will receive care at minimum or no cost, why bother 
about taking all the information and processing costs of taking-up the subsidy? And lastly, 
there is a small percentage of the population that dislikes the idea of insurance, no matter it 
is fully subsidized (Chernew et al, 1997). In a country like Colombia, with strong security 
concerns, it is not uncommon that people do not want to be identified, and some of them 
prefer to frequently change their places of residence to avoid personal risks. 
 
These factors explaining non-take-up behavior are quite relevant in Bogota, the capital city 
of Colombia.  Whereas the city has the highest coverage of the poor through SHI 
enrollment, recent efforts to increase coverage have been frustrated and thousands of 
available slots are not taken-up by those eligible. Perhaps the eligible population that was 
willing to take-up the subsidy has been exhausted and additional efforts will have to be 
taken to have enrollment increase. This is not the case however for the rest of the country.  
 
One plausible explanation for the frustrated efforts to increase coverage has to do with 
payment incentives to providers. First, the local health authority pays public hospitals on a 
per-case basis for care provided to the uninsured. Second, insurers in the SHI negotiate 
capitated contracts with public hospitals. So, the hospital will be better off if it maximizes 
the outputs to be billed to the health authority at the expense of minimizing output to SHI 
enrollees. It can also be said that insurers in the SHI scheme have an incentive to put access 
barriers, given the incentives inherent in the insurance scheme.  As hospital users realize 
differences in access, voice spreads about the access barriers faced by SHI enrollees, and 
hence the apathetic reaction by the target population. 
 
A different alternative would be to focus subsidized insurance on high-risk individuals, 
specifically those with chronic conditions. Given that their expected loss ratios are much 
higher than the rest of the population, and their higher probability to incur impoverishing 
expenses, it makes sense to enroll these individuals with a comprehensive benefit package.  
However, this alternative poses additional challenges regarding selection incentives and the 
estimation of an actuarially fair premium.  
 Conclusion  
 
This study confirms the hypothesis that health insurance is effective at providing financial 
protection for poor households. In the particular case of the SHI scheme for the poor in 
Colombia, if coverage is expanded to enroll the poor-uninsured, out-of-pocket expenses 
would be reduced in about 50% at the country level, and at least 43% at the Bogota level. 
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 NATIONAL  BOGOTA 
   Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Self-reported health status           
Fair -1.022  -8.44***  -1.131  -6.18*** 
Good -2.046  -14.46***  -2.047  -9.82*** 
Very Good  -2.792  -9.58***  -2.015  -5.46*** 
Wald test   86.76***  34.81*** 
Chronic disease  0.405  4.51***  0.444  3.27*** 
Age-gender categories             
1-4 -0.063  -0.21  0.078  0.200 
5-14 -0.872  -3.04***  -1.056  -2.73*** 
15-44 male  -0.697  -2.43**  -0.777  -2.02** 
15-44 female  -0.395  -1.400  -0.513  -1.370 
45-59 -0.691  -2.37**  -0.575  -1.490 
60 +  -0.666  -2.24**  -0.542  -1.390 
Wald test  7.99***  5.32*** 
Log income per-capita  0.525  9.4***  0.431  4.69*** 
Education             
Primary  0.433  1.82*       
Secondary  0.702  2.95***       
Post-secondary  0.466  1.74*       
Wald test   6.24***       
Region             
Oriental  -0.214  -1.640       
Central  0.173  1.320       
Pacífico  0.194  1.69*       
Bogotá  -0.266  -2.33**       
Antioquia  0.266  1.95*       
Valle  0.092  0.590       
San Andrés  -1.123  -3.48***       
Orinoquia  0.447  2.61***       
Wald test  8.67***       
Constant   -6.933  -9.36***  -5.412  -4.7*** 
N 17823  6590 
General Wald test  29.85***  24.68*** 
*p < 0.1  **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Table 2. Log-odds for the probability of having any OOP>0 among poor-uninsured.  
 
 NATIONAL  BOGOTA 
    Coeff. t  Coeff. t 
Self-reported health status             
Fair  -0.951 -4.32***  -0.419 -1.7* 
Good  -1.939 -8.19***  -1.654 -6.45*** 
Very  Good  -1.504 -4.07***  -2.218 -5.22*** 
Wald test  30.80***  32.76*** 
Chronic  disease  0.674 4.17***  0.563 3.34*** 
Age-gender categories             
1-4 -0.557  -1.7*  0.408  1.100 
5-14  -1.257 -4.03***  -0.370 -1.030 
15-44  male  -1.114 -3.51***  -0.933 -2.57** 
15-44  female  -0.581 -1.91**  -0.330 -0.930 
45-59  -1.109 -3.31***  -0.882 -2.28** 
60  +  -1.491 -4.1***  -1.308 -2.93*** 
Wald test  7.26***  8.43*** 
Log  income  per-capita  0.531 5.55***  0.246 2.14** 
Rural  -0.620  -3***       
Region             
Oriental  0.175  0.820       
Central  -0.242  -1.210       
Pacífico  0.061  0.360       
Bogotá  -0.463  -2.96***       
Antioquia  -0.374  -1.480       
Valle  -0.118  -0.580       
San Andrés  -0.896  -1.460       
Orinoquia  -0.355  -1.400       
Wald test   3.26**       
Local Area             
Chapinero     -2.493  -2.27** 
Santa Fe      -0.967  -2.75*** 
San Cristóbal      -1.661  -4.81*** 
Usme     -1.072  -3.31*** 
Tunjuelito     -0.619  -1.94* 
Bosa     -1.012  -3.1*** 
Kennedy     -0.657  -1.94* 
Fontibon     -1.142  -3.11*** 
Engativa     -1.035  -2.68*** 
Suba     -0.407  -1.160 
Barrios Unidos      -1.185  -3.05*** 
Teusaquillo     -0.730  -1.080 Martires     -2.055  -5.2*** 
Antonio Nariño      -0.996  -2.92*** 
Puente Aranda      -0.873  -2.26** 
Candelaria     -1.474  -3.46*** 
Rafael Uribe      -1.378  -4.15*** 
Ciudad Bolívar      -1.048  -3.24*** 
Wald test        3.36*** 
Constant  -5.830 -5.03***  -2.585 -1.75* 
N 8481  4866 
General Wald test  12.66***  7.30*** 
*p < 0.1  **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Table 3. Log-odds for inpatient OOP>0 given any OOP>0, among SHI enrollees. 
 
 NATIONAL  BOGOTA 
    Coeff. t  Coeff. t 
Chronic  disease  0.315 2.15**  0.424 1.86* 
Age  0.007 2.4**  0.010 2.17** 
Log income per-capita  -0.324  -3.22***       
Education             
Primary        2.095  2.44** 
Secondary        1.635  1.94* 
Post-secondary        1.446  1.65 
Wald test        2.49* 
# household members        0.176  3.07*** 
Region             
Oriental  0.259  1.1       
Central  0.473  1.97**       
Pacífico  -0.330  -1.54       
Bogotá  0.397  1.92*       
Antioquia  -0.237  -0.94       
Valle  -0.221  -0.77       
San Andrés  0.805  1.27       
Orinoquia  0.444  1.44       
Wald test  4.05***       
Constant 3.165  2.66***  -2.987  -3.41*** 
N 1926  615 
General Wald test  4.50***  3.70*** 
*p < 0.1  **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Table 4. Log-odds for inpatient OOP>0 given any OOP>0, among poor-uninsured 
 NATIONAL  BOGOTA 
   Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Self-reported health status           
Fair     -1.539  -3.07*** 
Good 0.521  2.31**  -1.691  -3.39*** 
Very Good      -4.190  -4.52*** 
Wald test         7.43*** 
Chronic disease  0.589  2.08**       
Age-gender categories             
1-4  0.352  0.56       
5-14  0.556  0.96       
15-44 male  1.024  1.74*       
15-44 female  1.266  2.3**       
45-59  0.991  1.63       
60 +  0.835  1.28       
Wald test  2.01*    
Log income per-capita  -0.404  -2.31**  -0.398  -1.62 
Constant  3.199 1.55  5.938  1.88** 
N 893  463 
General Wald test  2.57***  5.66*** 
*p < 0.1  **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Table 5. Log-linear regression coefficients for any OOP>0 among SHI enrollees. 
 NATIONAL  BOGOTA 
    Coeff. t  Coeff. t 
Chronic disease  0.330  2.38**       
Age  0.011  3.97***       
Age-gender categories             
1-4        1.093  2.67*** 
5-14        0.720  2.15** 
15-44 male        0.774  1.98** 
15-44 female        0.913  2.95*** 
45-59        0.525  1.61 
60 +        0.873  2.6** 
Wald test        2.02* 
Log  income  per-capita  0.578 5.52*** 0.679 4.72*** 
# household members  0.063  2.09**       
Rural  0.238  1.84*       
Region             
Oriental  0.678  2.85***       
Central  0.362  1.33       
Pacífico  0.460  2.22**       
Bogotá  0.680  3.01***       
Antioquia  0.287  1.34       
Valle  0.296  0.96       
San Andrés  1.552  2.99***       
Orinoquia  0.662  1.98**       
Wald test de Wald  2.20**    
Constant  3.298  2.52**       
N 1072  301 
General Wald test  7.90***  5.47*** 
*p < 0.1  **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Table 6. Log-linear regression coefficients for any OOP>0 among poor uninsured 
  NATIONAL BOGOTA 
   Coeff. t  Coeff.  t 
Self-reported health status             
Fair  -0.754  -2.61***       
Good -0.693  -2.44**  -0.373  -2.02** 
Very Good  -0.274  -0.9       
Wald test   4.25***       
Log income per-capita  0.647 4.25***  0.520  2.66*** 
Education             
Primary        0.790  2.8*** 
Secondary        1.320  9.12*** 
Post-secondary        1.510  5.24*** 
Wald test        30.84*** 
# Household members  0.071  1.89*       
Rural  0.533  2**       
Constant 4.417  2.39**  4.532  1.93* 
N 531  264 
General Wald test  4.76***    
*p < 0.1  **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Table 7. Log-linear regression coefficients for inpatient OOP>0 among SHI enrollees. 
 NATIONAL  BOGOTA 
    Coeff. t  Coeff. t 
Self-reported health status             
Fair  -0.101 -0.46  -0.116 -0.45 
Good  -0.545 -2.07**  -0.816 -3.1*** 
Very  Good  -0.878 -2.47**  -0.261 -0.61 
Wald test   3.42**  5.82*** 
Chronic disease  0.419  2.19**       
Age  0.010  2.66***       
Gender        -0.341  -1.81* 
Log  income  per-capita  0.401 2.95*** 0.522 2.92*** 
# household members  0.101  3.28***       
Education             
Primary        1.277  3.68*** 
Secondary        1.153  3.52*** 
Post-secondary        0.703  1.75* 
Wald test        6.00*** 
Rural  0.466  2.75***       
Region             
Oriental  0.360  1.34       
Central  0.312  1.15       
Pacífico  0.364  1.34       
Bogotá  0.673  2.82***       
Antioquia  0.128  0.43       
Valle  -0.365  -1.16       
San Andrés  0.182  0.32       
Orinoquia  0.362  1.1       
Wald test  2.52**    
Local area             
Chapinero        2.721  3.19*** 
Santa Fe        1.656  2.43** 
San Cristóbal        1.971  2.76*** 
Usme        1.494  2.11** 
Tunjuelito        1.234  1.72* 
Bosa        2.043  2.73*** 
Kennedy        2.451  3.2*** 
Fontibon        2.191  2.85*** 
Engativa        1.719  2.42** 
Suba        2.125  2.48** 
Barrios Unidos        2.798  3.31*** 
Teusaquillo        2.148  3.02*** 
Martires        2.052  2.75*** Antonio Nariño        1.610  1.85* 
Puente Aranda        1.955  2.54** 
Candelaria        2.064  2.86*** 
Rafael Uribe        1.543  2.04** 
Ciudad Bolívar        1.671  2.44** 
Wald test        1.62* 
Constant  5.027 2.97*** 2.606 1.1 
N 854  314 
General Wald test  6.67***  3.82*** 
*p < 0.1  **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Table 8. Log-linear regression coefficients for inpatient OOP>0 among poor-uninsured. 
 
 NATIONAL  BOGOTA 
    Coeff. t  Coeff. t 
Self-reported health status             
Fair  -0.882 -2.32**  -0.375 -1.76* 
Good  -1.221  -3.06***       
Very Good  -1.541  -3.29***       
Wald test  4.00***       
Age-gender categories             
1-4  1.282  1.86*       
5-14  0.610  0.85       
15-44 male  0.512  0.72       
15-44 female  0.627  0.92       
45-59  1.272  1.83*       
60 +  0.842  1.1       
Wald test  2.46**       
Gender        -0.664  -3.02*** 
Log  income  per-capita  0.695 3.42***  0.495 2.67*** 
# household members  0.186  2.44**       
Region             
Oriental  0.237  0.63       
Central  0.380  1.06       
Pacífico  0.373  0.88       
Bogotá  0.232  0.81       
Antioquia  -0.477  -1.25       
Valle  0.379  1.07       
San Andrés  1.042  3.05***       
Orinoquia  0.058  0.15       
Wald test  2.20**       
Constant  5.027 2.606  6.309 2.82*** 
N 362  199 
General Wald test     6.78*** 
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